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We consider the use of large corpora for training compu-
tationally creative systems, particularly those that write 
new text based on the style of an existing author or genre.  
Under Canadian copyright law, a key concern for 
whether this is “fair dealing” is whether this usage will 
result in new creations that compete with those in the 
corpus.  While recent law review articles in the United 
States suggest that training models on such corpora 
would be “fair use” in the United States, we argue that 
Canadian law may, in fact, forbid this use when the new 
products compete with works in the original corpus. 
Introduction 
The fair-dealing exception (section 29 – 29.2) in the Cana-
dian Copyright Act (RSC 1985, c. C-42) allows the use of 
copyright-protected materials without permission or pay-
ment of royalties under certain circumstances.  These cir-
cumstances include research, criticism, review, and private 
study, as long as what is done with the work is “fair.”  For 
the purpose of criticism and review, proper citation of the 
copyrighted material is also required. 
“Fair” dealing is not the clearest of concepts: There is no 
checklist with a target score that ensures that use is certain 
to be judged fair.  Instead, there are a collection of factors 
that are evaluated as part of the review process. This collec-
tion of factors is not part of the Copyright Act.  Instead, it 
was provided in a Supreme Court of Canada ruling, CCH 
Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada (2004 SCC 
13).  The factors include the purpose of the use, the amount 
of the copyrighted material being used, and the effect of the 
use on the original work (for example, does the use compete 
with the market for the original work?). 
Natural language corpora, as used by machine learning 
systems, form an interesting test case for this “fair-dealing” 
regime.  Current state-of-the-art text-generation systems use 
truly massive data sets of human-authored text and generate 
text that is more and more like what a human would write.  
In 2021, such systems are trained on billions of words of 
human-authored text (Brown et al. 2020).  
A rapidly growing paradigm in text generation these days 
is to use GPT-2 fine-tuned with an author-specific or do-
main-specific corpus. (See, for example, Lee and Hsiang 
(2019).  This approach yields texts with the surface features 
of an author/domain, while taking advantage of the high-
grammatical fluency of transformers like GPT-2 (Radford et 
al. 2019).  Therefore, this use can have two different com-
ponents:  modelling the corpus to inform the overall gener-
ation of the new text, and (possibly) inclusion of some short 
bits of the training corpus directly in generated works.  (The 
current state-of-the-art system is actually GPT-3, which is 
fairly hard for most researchers and companies to access; in 
contrast, GPT-2 is readily available.)  The resulting docu-
ments are often surprisingly hard to distinguish from hu-
man-authored text, although many still require a fair amount 
of human editing and correction.  One example was an op-
ed written by GPT-3, titled “A robot wrote this entire article 
are you scared yet, human?,” published in The Guardian in 
September 2020, but the true story of a lot of these products 
involves a huge amount of human massaging and shaping 
(Uitdenbogerd 2020; Jordanous 2017). 
Many corpora for these systems are created by Web 
crawlers.  This is certainly the case for the base corpus on 
which GPT-2 is trained, and could be true for other creative 
systems; for example, a poetry generator might be trained 
with user-submitted poetry on a poetry forum.  This raises 
the question of the copyright status of the source documents, 
which may be set by the organizers of these fora themselves, 
in their own policies.   
All of this leads to the question:  Is creating a machine 
learning corpus “fair dealing” if the material contained in it 
is itself copyrighted?  Here, we investigate this question by 
looking at the factors defining “fair dealing” in Canadian 
case law, after briefly contrasting the situation in Canada 
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with the “fair use” model used in the United States.  We fo-
cus our consideration on a factor concerned with creation of 
new works that compete with the copyrighted works being 
used for training, and explore a number of scenarios for this 
use.  Ultimately, we argue that such use may, in fact, be un-
fair, and give a brief discussion of the consequences of this 
conclusion. 
Existing Literature on the Question 
The question of copyright and large-scale corpora is not 
novel; copyright issues for translation corpora, for example, 
have previously been discussed (Wilkinson 2006), and there 
is a short primer on how natural language corpora intersect 
with German copyright law (DFG Review Board  
n.d./2017).   The World Intellectual Property Organization 
has studied whether or not such corpora should be permitted 
under international rules (2019), and some experts have 
highlighted the rulings in the United States in both the Hathi 
Trust1 and the Google Books2 cases as showing that the 
American “fair use” concept allows for the creation of cor-
pora for research and other purposes. 
 In the Canadian context, Craig (2020) has explored 
whether computer-authored texts deserve copyright protec-
tion (her opinion is that they do not), and has expressed her 
concern that current law does not make clear how infringe-
ment concerns, if they were held to be valid, could be tar-
geted at infringing systems that, in her view, lack autonomy 
as creators. 
 Our question is a bit different, as we focus on compu–
tationally creative authoring systems.  These have not been 
the focus of any Canadian legal scholarship that we can 
identify.  We focus on Canadian law, because it governs the 
computational creativity research of the first author.  
Fair Dealing, Not Fair Use 
We specifically are asking about machine language corpora 
in light of the Canadian concept of “fair dealing,” not the 
“fair-use” exemption available to users in the United States 
(Title 17 USC §107).  U.S. law allows for researchers to 
make copies of copyrighted materials, and in both the 
Google Books and Hathi Trust cases, large-scale digital 
analysis of corpora (for example, to enable search) was seen 
as non-infringing, as long as users were not gaining access 
to chunks of the copyrighted materials in those corpora that 
 
1 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 2014 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 10803, Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) P30,617, 42 Media L. Rep. 
1898, 111 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1001, 2014 WL 2576342 (United 




2 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 2015 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 17988, Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) P30,832, Copy. L. Rep. 
(CCH) P30,832, 43 Media L. Rep. 2981, 116 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 
were commercially relevant, such as whole pages of books, 
or definitions found in dictionaries.  Some legal academics 
in the U.S. have argued for a much wider exemption, both 
for research in general, and for text and data mining in spe-
cific, claiming that the fair-use principles allow for it be-
cause of the positive benefits to society of scientific research 
(Carroll 2019).  Sobel (2017) argues that Artificial Intel-
lignece (AI) is in a potential crisis if learning from corpora 
and creating derived works is not held to be fair use, and 
argues that current U.S. law, which he deems to support this 
use, in fact gives U.S. researchers a competitive advantage.   
Very recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has also ruled (in 
Google v. Oracle3) that Google’s use of some Java applica-
tion programming interface code was fair use,  
although the ruling did not answer the question of whether 
the code itself was copyrightable.  This ruling is not directly 
applicable to the case of corpora and fair use, but nonethe-
less suggests a willingness to allow for technology innova-
tion as fair use, consistent with Sobel’s hopes.   
More Detail:  Factors for Fair Dealing 
The full list of valid contexts for “fair dealing” are:  re-
search, private study, criticism, review, education, satire, 
parody, and news reporting.  Creating a text generator is 
likely not education.  If the generator is writing news arti-
cles, critiques or reviews, then the use of source materials 
about the events being reported on, or the work being re-
viewed or critiqued is fair dealing, but the base corpus being 
used to train language-model parameters is not itself being 
used in reporting, criticism or review.   
Most of the time, a text generator is also not private study.  
Satire and parody may be the underlying goal for some text 
generators (e.g., mashups of the works of H.P. Lovecraft and 
the King James Bible, for example, Stross (2013)), but these 
are not the most common, and do not form the basis for the 
examples we discuss later in this paper. 
The “Research” exception to the Canadian Copyright Act 
is broadly defined by case law; the ruling in CCH v. LSUC 
(2004) holds that “The fair dealing exception under s. 29 is 
open to those who can show that their dealings with a copy-
righted work were for the purpose of research or private 
study.  ‘Research’ must be given a large and liberal interpre-
tation in order to ensure that users’ rights are not unduly 
constrained.  I agree with the Court of Appeal that research 
1423 (United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Octo-
ber 16, 2015, Decided). https://advance.lexis.com/api/ 
document?collection=cases&id=urn:contentItem:5H5B-G231-
F04K-J02C-00000-00&context=1516831 
3 Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 209 L. Ed. 2d 
311, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 1864, 2021 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 391, 28 Fla. 
L. Weekly Fed. S 727, 2021 WL 1240906 (Supreme Court of the 
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is not limited to non-commercial or private contexts.” (at ¶ 
51).  As such (and see below as well), “research” probably 
does include commercial research, although the intent of the 
researchers is clearly relevant. 
Once the use is assigned to the general category of “re-
search,” we must look at the various factors typically as-
sessed by Canadian case law.  The following purposes were 
laid out in the CCH v. LSUC ruling:  “[T]he purpose of the 
dealing, the character of the dealing, the amount of the deal-
ing, the nature of the work, available alternatives to the deal-
ing and the effect of the dealing on the work are all factors 
that could help determine whether or not a dealing is fair.  
These factors may be more or less relevant to assessing the 
fairness of a dealing depending on the factual context of the 
allegedly infringing dealing.  In some contexts, there may 
be factors other than those listed here that may help a court 
decide whether the dealing was fair.” (2004, at ¶ 60).  
1) The purpose of the dealing:  What is the user’s motive?  
This factor looks at the user’s “purpose or motive in using 
the . . . work” (¶ 54).  
This is complicated.  Most academic research is not di-
rectly commercial, but a lot of the use in the context of non-
profit work is itself building data sets that will be used com-
mercially.  This may create situations where the motive 
changes over time.  The boundary between non-profit and 
commercial research is fuzzy these days, and particularly in 
AI.  
2) The character of the dealing:  What was done with the 
work?  Was it isolated or an ongoing use?  How widely was 
the work distributed?   
This is also complicated.  The usage is often a single-use 
event (e.g., to fine-tune the language model), but the result-
ant parametrized model is repeatedly used, possibly with 
different prompts.  The actual activity is usually to model 
sentence structure and how sentences flow from one sen-
tence to another, but in practice, since the parametrization of 
a deep learning model is impossible to easily describe, it is 
entirely possible that chunks of the work will be directly 
“copied” into the parameters of the model, and may appear 
in the resultant generated texts.  These occurrences of small 
chunks of copying would likely be an “insubstantial use,”4 
and therefore, not require copyright permission, but it is un-
predictable whether or not they would happen, or how often.  
The copyrighted work in the corpus typically would not be 
distributed, but the parameterization, in the form of the 
structure and weights of a neural network model, typically 
would be.  
3) The amount of the dealing:  How much of the work 
was used?  How important was the content that was used? 
Typically, the entire work is used; the goal is to have as 
large of a corpus of domain-specific writing as possible. 
4) Alternatives to the dealing:  Could a different work 
have been used?  
 
4 Access Copyright - Tariff for Provincial and Territorial Govern-
ments, 2005-2014. [2015] Copyright Board of Canada.  Retrieved  
This, again, is complicated.  The goal of these generative 
models is to use as rich of a corpus as possible:  Using such 
a corpus allows for more of the natural flow in an author’s 
writing to be modeled.  So, if the goal is “as refined an ap-
proximation as possible,” then, no, a different work could 
not have been used. 
5) The nature of the work being used:  Does dissemination 
aid the public interest? 
No.  The work is, in fact, not being disseminated via this 
kind of modeling; to the extent that it is found within the 
parametrization, recipients of the model could not recon-
struct the original work.  
6) The effect of the dealing on the original work:  Does 
the use compete with the market of the original work? 
This is possibly the most complicated question.  In the 
next section, we look at this question in more detail, explor-
ing a variety of computational creativity scenarios. 
Competitive Use and  
Computational Creativity 
To the question of “does the use compete with the market of 
the original work?,” the answer is especially complicated.  
In the CCH v. LSUC (2004) ruling, it was made clear that 
this is not merely an abstract question:  Copyright owners 
have to supply evidence of harm to their market because of 
the use in question.  The onus of proving that dealing is fair 
is on the user, but such users typically lack the ability to see 
sales figures.  “If there had been evidence that the publish-
ers’ markets had been negatively affected by the Law Soci-
ety’s custom photocopying service, it would have been in 
the publishers’ interest to tender it at trial.” (¶ 72).  In a fol-
low-up ruling, Alberta (Ed) v. CCLA (2012), the mere fact 
that sales have declined was not taken as sufficient proof 
that the use of copyrighted materials was a material factor in 
proving unfair use:  “[O]ther than the bald fact of a decline 
in sales over 20 years, there is no evidence from Access 
Copyright demonstrating any link between photocopying 
short excerpts and the decline in textbook sales.” (¶ 35). 
With this context in mind, we can consider a variety of 
ways works might be used in corpora, and examine whether 
these uses would compete in the market with the original: 
1) Automated news-writing systems.  The system that is 
built certainly competes with the journalists whose work is 
being used, but likely is not competing with the specific ar-
ticles of the corpus, since the news-writing system will cre-
ate stories about events occurring after the articles it was 
trained on.  The text humans write about individual news 
events may be copyrighted, but the facts themselves are not 
protected by copyright.  The system may compete with the 
owners of the copyright (the newspapers in which the work 
appeared), as well:  If a start-up using a computational news 
writer builds a corpus of articles from The Globe and Mail, 
from the Copyright Board website. https://decisions.cb-cda. 
gc.ca/cb-cda/decisions/en/item/366791/index.do 
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that start-up’s product may compete with the Globe.  Sys-
tems that write news editorials are closer to the creative writ-
ing systems discussed next. 
2) Automated creative writing systems.  The system that 
is built will create works in the same genre as the original 
work; in fact, they may be even designed to mimic a single 
author’s style.  As of 2021, such systems are mostly curios-
ities:  They require quite a bit of editing to make song lyrics 
(Ackerman and Loker 2016) or newspaper op-eds, and 
again, the training data are about moments in the past, but 
they are progressing quite speedily.  It is entirely possible 
that in certain genres or domains, consumers will (know-
ingly or not) purchase computer-generated works, trained on 
corpora of human-generated work in the same field, in pref-
erence to new or existing work by humans.   
To that end, yes, the systems that result from corpora can 
compete with the market of the original work.  We note that 
this overall space is huge:  systems that generate text, music, 
visual art, dance patterns, and more. This suggests that if the 
training data are copyrightable, the same overall questions 
as we are raising in this paper probably apply more broadly 
to other domains.  
3) Automated patent generation.  The goal of these sys-
tems is to create a patent “autocomplete” system which, 
trained on a corpus of patents, can start with the preamble of 
a patent and generate text that belongs in the patent (Lee and 
Hsiang 2019).  This is obviously a remarkable goal, but here, 
again, the extent to which the new inventions might compete 
with the existing ones is likely to become more of an issue 
in the future.  More generally, automatic legal authoring sys-
tems are definitely starting to come into their own, drafting 
motions, for example (Hudgins 2020), and their work abso-
lutely competes with the work of human lawyers. 
4) Automated scientific paper generation.  Again, this is 
a blue-sky idea.  We would be delighted if we did not have 
to chase down the citations this short article requires, and 
instead, a computer did it for us.  But in theory, one could 
write an abstract and the paper could write itself around the 
abstract.  Previously, this has mostly been used for satire,5 
not for real research.  Regardless, it is entirely possible that 
the existence of computationally generated papers would 
make the peer-review process collapse due to the required 
labour to assess all of those new papers, or that such papers 
might well compete with those in the corpus, particularly if 
the corpus was made of papers that “stand the test of time,” 
or the like.    
In this manuscript, we do not consider chatbots.  In this 
case, the system probably does not use copyrighted materi-
als much, and will be trained using transcripts of natural di-
alogues, or successful customer-service interactions, or sim-
ilar sources.  Chat bots are also not consistent with the rest 
of the frame of this article, as the model will involve a lot 
 
5 For example, SCIgen (http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/scigen), an auto-
matic CS paper generator, was used to generate a submission that 
was accepted to a predatory CS conference in 2005 (Ball 2005). 
more discourse analysis and (often) more of a model of what 
customer-service interaction a human participant is seeking 
to resolve.   
Conclusion 
Overall, then, the question of competition between the result 
of a corpus’ use and the corpus itself is complicated, but par-
ticularly thorny in the context of creative-writing systems.  
Ultimately, if computational creative-writing systems be-
come successful, then such systems will be competing with 
exactly the producers (and quite possibly even the creative 
artifacts themselves) through which the systems were 
trained.  Rather than buying a greeting card for your 
spouse’s birthday, you might just send an automatically gen-
erated message, with a cheery computer-generated video 
based on a corpus of existing greeting cards.  Rather than 
using existing pop songs as the soundtrack for a promotional 
video, you might use a “new” song, whose lyrics are pro-
duced by an engine trained on a corpus of existing pop 
songs.  Rather than buying a copy of a Newbury winning 
book for your grandson’s birthday, you might buy a book 
written by a computer, using a corpus of existing children’s 
books.  The possibilities are endless.  
As such, producing corpora for training creative-writing 
systems will, over time, diminish the market for the copy-
righted works in those corpora.  Thus, building corpora of 
copyrighted materials for the purpose of training machine 
language models that compete in the same market as the 
training materials is unlikely to be fair dealing under Cana-
dian law, particularly when it is practiced in commercial re-
search. 
This state of affairs places Canadian researchers at a dis-
advantage compared to researchers from other countries, 
most notably the U.S.  If, as Sobel (2019) argues, U.S. law 
enables training of machine learning models from large col-
lected corpora, and Canadian law does not, then researchers, 
such as the first author, must either gain permission to train 
models from copyright holders, use only materials with 
open licenses or in the public domain, or risk infringement 
lawsuits.  We terminated a recent project, in part because 
gaining a good corpus of non-infringing materials was not 
easy.  Either a change is needed in the Canadian copyright 
regime, or certain research may be chilled.  
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